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Abstract
Collective intelligence is easily observable in
group-based or interpersonal pairwise interaction,
and is enabled by environment-mediated stigmergic
signals. Based on innate ability, human sensors not
only sense and coordinate, but also tend to solve
problems through these signals. This paper argues
the efficacy of computational intelligence for
adopting the collective language-action cues of
human intelligence as stigmergic signals to
differentiate deception. A study was conducted in
synchronous computer-mediated communication
environment with a dataset collected from 2014 to
2015. An online game was developed to examine the
accuracy of certain language-action cues (signs),
deceptive actors (agents) during pairwise interaction
(environment). The result of a logistic regression
analysis demonstrates the computational efficacy of
collective language-action cues in differentiating and
sensing deception in spontaneous communication.
This study contributes to the computational modeling
in adapting human intelligence as a base to attribute
computer-mediated deception.

1. Introduction
Pairwise interaction can facilitate our cognitive
understanding of each other, and language provides
the means for effective communication. Differences
in context, differences among the parties involved,
differences in time, place, and even communication
medium—each influence not only what is
communicated but also how communication is
perceived. For example, a humorously sarcastic
remark about the economy made to friends while
socializing on Friday evening may very well be
entirely inappropriate were it to be made at work
during a budget meeting on Monday morning.
Likewise, taking the words from one conversation
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and applying them in another can imbue the words
with an entirely different meaning to the original—
and presumably intended—meaning. In the context of
computer-mediated communication, language-action
cues can become important indicators in identifying
computer-mediated deception [1]. Cues found in
language help enable collective understanding, and
thus provide communication context for collective
intelligence. In this regard, communicative signals
shared by communicators are also critically important
in assisting deceptive intent in computer-mediated
communication (CMC).
As CMC users are currently being exposed to an
increasing number and variety of risks associated
with
computer-mediated
deception
(e.g.,
unauthorized access to one’s personally identifiable
information, identity theft, as well as spear phishing
attacks), it is becoming more and more important—
and challenging—for users to be able to protect
themselves from these deceptive tricks. Our ability to
understand a message and thereby correctly interpret
a sender’s communicated intent and meaning
becomes ever important. In face-to-face (F2F)
communication, the receiver’s assessment of context
is informed not only by words, but also by other
physical cues such as body language and facial
expressions. In “cue lean” text-based CMC, the
message receiver only has reference to the message
sender’s words themselves. Consequently, the
intelligence generated in human interaction becomes
one of the few means available to assess the intent of
the individual(s) with whom one is communicating,
as well as the truthfulness or reliability of the
information being exchanged.
Human sensors not only have the intuitive ability
to coordinate, but also the innate capability to sense
and respond to anomalies. In this paper, we first
describe the concept of collective intelligence;
specifically, the human sensor’s ability to detect
deception in an interaction network is emphasized.
We then review deceptive communication styles,
which forms the core components of stigmergy;
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deceivers (agents), cues (signs) across different
contexts (environment). Next, we discuss a study
conducted to investigate the stigmergy in the pairwise
communication context. We compare and contrast the
findings of this examination into communication
cues. The paper concludes with some reflections,
implications, and limitations, along with potential
directions for future research.

2. Collective Intelligence
Collective intelligence refers to complex behavior
created by the simple interaction between individuals
that follow basic rules, and is generally defined as
“the ability of a group to solve more problems than
its individual members” [2]. A simple example can
be the ants’ or bees’ ability to map out their
environment. Individually, these insects experience
limited capacity in processing information; however,
collectively, they can decide the fields to which they
exploit and the danger about to occur. The collective
cognition is demonstrated and communicated through
a “stigmergic signal [2],” or an innate “gene [3],” in
these insects’ society. In human society, people
interact more autonomously due to different
communication modes and medium. Nonetheless,
people can work and coordinate together to solve
complex problems in a surprisingly intelligent way.
Malone, Laubacher et al. [3] illustrated the open
source software development community as a
prototypical example of collective intelligence.
The genes of collective intelligence can create,
decide and build a genome of any shape and kind by
asking simple questions of Who, What, Where, Why
and How [3]. Likewise, the genes can also sense
differences and anomalies in coordination activities.
Individuals pick up communication cues, find
information, and make their own decisions that then
influence the group’s intelligence and the results of
collective problem solving. Although, a group’s
decisions can be influenced by the individuals’
decisions and sharing of information, Woolley,
Chabris et al. [4] examined the collective intelligence
factor, and identified that this “c factor” does not
depend on the average individual intelligence, but
depends more on the average social sensitivity of
group members, which reflects the composition of
the group (e.g., equality in distribution of
conversational turn-taking), and the way the group
members interact (e.g., communication mode and
medium) when they are assembled.
Based on the observations of the insect swarmbehavior, Dipple, Raymond et al. [5] proposed a
macro-level view of the communication mechanism
that triggers responses in human society. Depending

on environment-mediated signals, this model defines
an abstract form of stigma semantics in stigmergy
with the core components: the agents, the
environment, and the sign(s). The agent’s ability to
coordinate, to sense, or to detect anomalies depends
on their interpretation of the meaning as mediated by
the manifestation of stigmergic signals and signs
when interacting. These core components also
correspond to the fundamentals of human sensors’
ability
to
interpret
and
sense
deceptive
communication.

3. Deceptive Communication
A common focus of the numerous studies on
deceptive communication is to identify particular
cues (behavioral, contextual, verbal or textual) that
can be associated with deception. Collectively, these
studies reveal several essential aspects of deception.
First, deception is “…a message knowingly
transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or
conclusion by the receiver” [6]. Thus, deception is a
volitional and intentional act. Simple “mistakes of
fact” would not constitute deception. Neither would it
be considered deception when a message sender
objectively communicates false information when
s/he believed the information to be true [7]. In
addition, research suggests that both the mode of
communication (synchronous [8] or asynchronous
[9]) and the specific medium chosen may provide
insight into to the type (planned or on-the-fly) and
severity (serious or inconsequential) of the deception
[10]. Finally, our ability to detect deception, in any
environment, depends on many different factors,
including the availability of certain types of cues.
These cues can function as an alert to the receiver to
be more critical of the information being provided.
Unfortunately, in a CMC environment, the
availability of cues is reduced (being limited to the
text in message-based exchanges) when compared to
F2F communication, thereby making detection of
deception particularly challenging in CMC.

3.1. Deceptive Agents
Communication is, of necessity, interactive. It
involves a sender and one or more receiver(s) who
are engaged in a (more-or-less) interactive exchange.
Within this exchange, there is an opportunity for the
message sender to influence the receiver(s) actions or
beliefs. Deceptive communication fundamentally
means purposefully misrepresenting or concealing
the truth, either by omission or commission [11].
Miller, Deturck et al. [12] described deceptive
communication as “…a general persuasive strategy
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that aims at influencing the beliefs, attitudes and
behaviors of others by means of deliberate message
distortions” (p. 99). Miller and Stiff [13] and Stiff
[14] characterized deceptive communication as an act
involving the intentional use of persuasive strategies
and activities to manipulate the receiver. Buller and
Burgoon’s [6] interpersonal deception theory (IDT)
further examines and explains how a deceiver (i.e.,
sender of a deceptive communication) strategically
shapes his/her communication behaviors by studying
the perceptions and suspicions of the receiver(s). As a
major theoretical lens, IDT views deceptive
communication as a strategic, interactive process on
the part of all parties, through which the deceiver
attempts to accomplish multiple objectives—
including
impression
management,
emotion
management and conversational management. IDT
suggests that, much like the move-and-counter-move
dynamics of a chess match, the influence of the
deceiver’s behavior on the receiver affects the
receiver’s behavior, which, in turn, affects the
deceiver’s strategy and behavior.
There are two critical truths about deception one
must appreciate. First, deception is common,
occurring in approximately one–quarter of all
communications [6], and second, if we charge
humans to detect deception, they tend to be bad at it
[1, 15].

3.2. Language-action Cues and Signs
3.2.1. F2F. F2F communication has an “advantage”
over CMC in terms of deception detection, in that
both verbal and nonverbal (i.e., physical) cues are
available to the message receiver. Indeed, physical
nonverbal cues are more-or-less exclusive to F2F,
and include everything from body language and
facial expressions to the tone and pitch of voice and
pace of speech. Ekman and Friesen [11] specifically
studied such nonverbal/ physical communication
behaviors as indicators of deception. In particular,
they explored how certain nonverbal cues—
unconsciously or subconsciously manifested by a
party to a communication—operate to provide clues
to deception. This phenomenon is referred to as
nonverbal leakage. Granhag and Strömwall [16]
likewise examined deception in a F2F context, using
a credibility assessment technique, statement validity
analysis (SVA), to evaluate both verbal and
nonverbal behaviors during an in-person F2F
interview event. Their findings indicate that speech
rate, pauses, gaze aversion, and smiles/laughs were
all salient and statistically significant nonverbal cues
to deception. While physical-based cues (e.g., body
language, facial expressions, and even vocal pitch

and tone and pace of speech) are virtually nonexistent in text-based CMC environment, other verbal
and nonverbal cues are indeed shared between CMC
and F2F communication.
3.2.2. CMC. Text-based CMC is “cue lean,” in that it
lacks the physical cues to deception available in F2F
communication. However, certain communication
cues can nonetheless still be observed and catalogued
within a CMC environment [17-19]. These
communication features and language-action cues,
such as first-person references, emotion words,
inhibition words, prepositions, and conjunctions,
have all been shown to be indicators that can
differentiate deceivers from truth tellers [17]. Use of
more or fewer sensory or spatiotemporal words, and
changes in the diversity and complexity of language
have also been shown to be indicative [20]. And, as
in F2F, level of detail (less or more) is also
suggestive of deception in CMC—although in CMC,
relevance of detail appears to be more significant
than “detail” per se. That is, deceivers in CMC tend
to be wordier than truth-tellers, but the additional
words (i.e., details) provided are not necessarily
relevant or meaningful [19].
Another language-action cue that is important in
CMC (also in F2F communication) is immediacy
(i.e., ways in which a speaker can associate, or
distance him/herself from the content of his/her
message) [8]. Immediacy (whether verbal or nonverbal) is particularly important in detecting
deception. In the physical environment, nonverbal
immediacy cues include eye contact, body language,
facial expression, etc. While these specific cues were
first studied in a F2F environment, certain cues—
such as delay in response—are also present in CMC,
and operate similarly in both environments to create a
psychological distance between deceiver and his/her
communication partner [10].
It is worth noting that, in contrast to F2F
interactions, CMC deceivers statistically tend to take
shorter pauses between messages (i.e., time between
two consecutive messages sent by them) than truthtellers [19]. Deceivers also have been found to have
shorter response latency (i.e., time between receiving
a message and responding to it) than truth-tellers,
which is consistent with results of studies
investigating response latency in F2F communication
[19]. Research has also suggested that deceivers tend
to use more restricted vocabulary and syntax, and to
be more casual in their linguistic style [12].
Many of these cues have been examined for the
purpose of developing an automated process to detect
deceptive intent, and many of them—including
quantity and consistency of detail—are measureable
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in a dynamic exchange of text messages by focusing
on specific features such as the use of adverbs,
adjectives, and inclusive words. It is thus possible to
benchmark verbal indicators (such as word count and
details of information disclosed) and capture certain
nonverbal behaviors (latency and usage of expression
words) in CMC environment, which can then be
statistically computed [19].

3.3. Environment
Identification of deception is a complex problem
that often requires ground truth verification [11, 15];
nevertheless, deception can be detected in
interpersonal communication [1, 21-23] as well as
group communication [24, 25]. Research into CMC
deception cues has examined a variety of media types
and modes of communication, while also exploring
the role of media choice and mode of
communication. The mode and medium of the
communication provide dependencies that shape
people’s
communication
behavior.
Here,
communication mode refers to whether the parties are
interacting in real time (synchronous) or are
communicating via messages exchanged back-andforth over time (asynchronous). Moreover, the mode
of any communication—whether it takes place in a
“virtual” CMC environment, or in a “real” F2F
environment—can also influence how one interacts
and communicates. One notable early study exploring
this problem at a high level was done by Hancock,
Thom-Santelli et al. [26]. Participants were asked to
journal their interactions and lies for seven (7)
consecutive days. The results were the foundation of
their “feature-based” model for studying deceptive
CMC, which attempts to derive cues to deceptive
communication by examining the specific features of
the medium chosen—particularly looking at the
communication
mode
(i.e.,
synchronous,
asynchronous, or either/both) associated with or
supported by the medium. Other salient factors
include whether the medium records the
communication or not, and whether the
communication is distributed. A fundamental
assumption of this model is that deception is
spontaneous, and therefore is more likely to occur
when media is “synchronous and distributed, but nonrecordable” [10].
In this section, we briefly discuss studies that
focus on both asynchronous and synchronous media
types and communication modes in interpersonal as
well as in group context.

or supported by, this research—social distance
theory—would seem most applicable when discussing
asynchronous communication. According to social
distance theory [27], the prevailing social disapproval
of deception, and the accompanying psychological
discomfort experienced by deceivers makes deceivers
attempt to distance or separate themselves from their
deception and the individual(s) they are attempting to
deceive. Therefore, according to social distance
theory, deceivers will tend to choose media offering
fewer cues to the receiver of the communication and,
thus, will be more likely to use an asynchronous mode
of communication.
A notable study examining language-action cues
captured from e-mails was conducted by Zhou,
Twitchell et al. [28]. This study evaluated deceptive
cues in a team-based “desert survival scenario” game,
and found that deceivers tended to be wordier as
compared to truth-tellers—particularly in terms of
using more verbs, modifiers and noun phrases in
peripheral expressions to provide useless or irrelevant
information. Moreover, Zhou and Zhang [19] found
that, in the context of asynchronous online
communication, deceivers tend to be more active in
language usage, and take shorter pauses between
messages and were more non-immediate than truthtellers (using more group references and modal
verbs). Another study examining CMC deception in
an asynchronous mode looked at the truthfulness of
online dating profiles. Toma and Hancock [29] found
that language-action cues involving emotion were
“more powerful in predicting deception” than
cognitive cues—with the notable exception that word
count (a cognitive cue) was again highly significant.
Likewise, Ott, Choi et al. [30] examined
asynchronous CMC through the lens of online hotel
reviews, investigating which linguistic features were
most indicative of a truthful review. The results
suggest that truthful reviews included more “sensorial
and concrete language” (especially concerning spatial
configurations—i.e. overall room space and space
usage) than false or deceptive ones, while deceptive/
fake reviews included more superlatives. Languageaction cues in transcripts of 911 (emergency)
telephone calls has also been studied [31], to
determine which cues are most indicative of bogus or
fake calls. The results from this study show that
deceptive callers were found to show more
“inhibition” (meaning, for example, delaying or
telling the dispatcher to “hold on a minute”).
Deceptive callers were also found to use more words
associated with immediacy (1st person pronoun) and
non-immediacy (3rd person pronoun).

3.3.1 Asynchronous Communication. One of two
main theoretical “schools of thought” coming out of,
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3.3.2. Synchronous Communication. A second
major theoretical framework—media richness
theory—seems most applicable to synchronous
communication. According to media richness theory,
much, if not most, deceptive communication is
equivocal in nature (i.e., intentionally ambiguous),
and thus is open to interpretation by the receiver (i.e.,
the individual the communicator is attempting to
deceive). Therefore, deceptive actors will tend to
choose media types that provide them multiple cues,
an opportunity for personalization, and immediate
feedback (i.e., synchronous and spontaneous)—
allowing them to ensure the equivocal nature of their
message and adjust their deceptive communication
strategy ‘on the fly,’ and thereby obfuscate their
deceptive intent [32, 33]. Four factors are used in
determining the richness of the medium: feedback
(spontaneous, immediate or delayed); number of cues
available to the receiver (including social cues);
language variety (i.e., the type and variety of symbols
used to convey the particular message); and personal
focus (i.e., infusing the message with personal feeling/
emotions [32]). The richer the medium, the better able
it is to convey equivocal messages.
Studies investigating CMC deception in a
synchronous mode of communication have tended to
focus on instant-messaging/ chat. For example, a
study by Hancock, Curry et al. [34] found that word
count was a significant predictor of deception in
semi-synchronous communication. Participants in the
dyad (consisting of one truthful and one deceptive
partner) were given time (5 minutes) before play was
to begin in which to review the fixed set of questions
to be used, and plan their responses. Thus, the
deceptive player was, in essence, given an
opportunity to plan and prepare a strategy for
implementing the intended deception(s). Further,
Toma and Hancock [29] suggested that first person
pronouns were used more by truth-tellers than
deceivers, and that deceivers use fewer selfreferences in CMC synchronous chat, but more thirdperson references—consistent with social distance
theory. To note, the differences of research
methodology employed in the above-mentioned
studies illustrates that timing is an important indicator
for identifying computer-mediated deception. The
collective representation of language-action cues
varies depending on the time allocated to deceivers.
3.3.3. Group Communication. Although many
studies have focused on interpersonal interactions in
CMC deception, a growing number of studies in this
area have also examined CMC deception from a
group-dynamics perspective. Taylor, Dando et al.
[35], for example, examined language-action cues

(specifically, personal pronouns, negative emotions,
feelings, cognitive processes, discrepancy and
tentative) in the context of deception through
(asynchronous) e-mail exchanges, within and between
teams in a common physical location. Taylor, Dando
et al.’s [35] findings were consistent with findings
from Toma and Hancock [29], [36], which indicate
that the deceptive “insiders” used more personal
pronouns than the others in their group. Additionally,
Taylor, Dando et al. [35] found that the designated
deceivers used more words associated with cognitive
processes (particularly, discrepancy and tentative).
This finding is contrary to the findings of Hancock,
Toma et al. [18] which suggested that affect
(emotion)-related words were more significant in
detecting deception in online dating profiles. While
both studies involved asynchronous communication,
Taylor, Dando et al.’s [35] study examined group
communication and interaction, and thus provides a
different context than Hancock, Toma et al.’s [18]
interpersonal communication studies on deception in
online dating profiles.
Ho, Hancock et al. [25], [24] examined behaviors
of a deceptive “insider” in spontaneous synchronous
chat-based group-dynamics context, and suggested
that deceptive “insiders” in computer-mediated
synchronous interactions will tend to use more words
associated with cognitive processes. Ho, Hancock et
al.’s [25] findings are consistent with those of Taylor,
Dando et al. [35], and suggest that deceptive
“insiders” tend to use words more associated with
cognitive processes in their communication with their
peers in either asynchronous or synchronous
communication.

4. Method
Our study incorporates core components of the
environment-mediated
stigmergic
signals
by
analyzing instances in pairwise interaction: deceivers
(agents) and truth-teller (agents), collective
language-action cues (signs) across different
scenarios (environment) as context. The data
collection and data cleaning process of this study are
described in this section.

4.1. Data Collection
The data were collected in 2014 and 20151. Each
game session consists of two players; a speaker and a
detector. Data were collected across a total of 80
1

The Florida State University’s Institutional Review Board
has approved human subject data collection (Protocols
#2014.13490 and #2015.15885).
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game sessions. 40 participants (22 males and 18
females) were randomly assigned into pairs, with each
pair playing a total of 4 game sessions. Players were
between 18 and 68 years of age. Players’ names were
replaced with pseudo-names to protect their privacy.
Each game session lasted approximately 30
minutes, and consisted of about 4 role-play
exchanges. At the end of each such exchange, the
players’ roles were automatically changed.

synchronous communication channels [21]. Figure 1
is a screenshot taken from a live game, and includes
role assignment and ground truth question.

4.2. Data Cleaning Process
The collected data were cleaned and spell
checked. The spell checker corrected most of the
spelling errors in the chat text, and common instantmessaging abbreviations (“LOL,” “U,” “2,” “4,” etc.)
were converted to their corresponding full written
forms. Any individual message containing fewer than
50 words total was excluded from the dataset because
these messages do not contain meaningful sentences
but gibberish words (e.g., yes, um, ok, etc.). The final
data set used in analysis consisted of a total of 2,196
lines of chat and 7,271 words.

5. Research Design and Data Analysis
This study investigates the collective languageaction cues as stigmergic signals that is most
indicative of deceptive intent in interpersonal
deception, specifically in spontaneous synchronous
chat-based CMC (environment). The research
approach focuses on developing specific metrics for
collective language-action cues as represented by
information behavior (signs), and analyzes
communication patterns that distinguish between
deceptive vs truthful actors (agents). This online game
provides a conceptual basis for understanding,
analyzing and designing ways to explore the dynamics
of intentional deception. The identification of textbased cues from these scenarios provides a means of
understanding and measuring the decision parameters
needed to detect online deception. It also enables us to
observe how people lie successfully (or
unsuccessfully) in different circumstances.

5.1. Environment
An interactive online game, called “Real or
Spiel2,” was designed and developed to present
players with real-time interactive simulated scenarios
requiring them to exchange either deceptive or
truthful statements specifically using instantaneous,
2

Developed at Florida State University.

Figure 1. Game interface [1]

5.2. Agents
Each game scenario involves two participants (i.e.,
players), who are placed in randomly assigned
pairings by the research team, and then randomly
assigned an outer role as either an initiating speaker
or a detector in each gaming session. The speaker in
each scenario is also randomly assigned an inner
role—either saint (truthful) or sinner (deceptive)—by
the RAND() random operator. The speaker establishes
the ground truth before the beginning of each scenario
by truthfully answering questions on a particular topic
from common knowledge domains such as finance,
skills or personal experiences. For example, the
ground truth question might be something like “Have
you ever visited Puerto Rico?” If, for example, the
speaker has visited the location, s/he would establish
the ground truth by answering “yes.” This provides a
baseline against the assessment of the truthfulness or
deceptiveness of his/her subsequent responses to the
questions posed by the detector during the scenario. In
the above example, the detector would ask questions
designed to learn whether or not the speaker had
visited the above-mentioned location, and the speaker
would try to convince the detector that s/he has not
visited such a location in the past. At the end of each
scenario, the detector tries to determine whether the
speaker was being deceptive or truthful based on
question-and-answer exchanges.

5.3. Language-action Cues and Signs
The linguistic cues were extracted according to the
categories established in the Linguistic Inquiry and
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Word Count (LIWC) tool [20, 37] after the data had
been cleaned. The specific LIWC categories we
included in our analysis are those set forth in Figure
1. In order to avoid or minimize possible
multicollinearity
problems,
cues
directly
corresponding to the “main” LIWC headings of
“cogmech” and “affect” were ultimately excluded, in
favor of including cues from their respective
subcategories (i.e., posemo, negemo, certain, incl,
excl, etc.).
Table 1. Language-action cues extracted by LIWC

χ2=35.8, p<0.01 (Table 2). While multicollinearity
may provide one possible explanation for this
apparently contradictory result (i.e., non-significant
predictors, but strong overall model), we had already
eliminated any variables that might have created such
a problem. Instead, in this case, we attribute this
phenomenon to the nature of communication: the
context itself. It is the context—the combination of
words—that is most indicative of deception, rather
than the words alone. Thus, even if individual
language-action cues themselves are not significant, a
particular combination of language-action cues may
well be significant in the ability to indicate deception.
Table 3. Categorical variables

We analyzed the final dataset using logistic
regression, with the dichotomous outcome variable
“Deceiver”
(0=truthful/
1=deceiver).
Our
independent/ predictor variables were the LIWC
categories illustrated in Table 1, plus ‘time-lag.’
Table 2. Fitness of the model

The model incorporating these variables was
statistically significant (p=0.003), as indicated in
Table 2. The specific variables and corresponding
statistical significance are set out in Table 3. In this
model, we found that two language-action cues were
statistically significant: Word Count (p=0.008) and
Insight (p=0.02). However, the rest of the languageaction cues, individually, were not statistically
significant in predicting or identifying potential
deception.
Nonetheless, logistic regression analysis indicates
the model itself is significant with a Chi-square of

5.4. Results and Discussion
The initial logistic regression on this model was
run with a (default) cut value of 0.5 (depicted in
Table 4), and yielded an overall accuracy of 75% in
correctly classifying “0s” (truth-tellers’ statements)
and “1s” (deceivers’ statements).
However, because the focus of our study is on
identifying deceivers (i.e., classification as a “1”), the
accuracy of the model specifically in categorizing
“1s” is equally important as overall accuracy. The
classification table (Table 4) shows the model to be
75% accurate in correctly classifying both “1s” as
deception and as “0s” as truthful statements (Table
4), as well as having 75% overall accuracy.
On initial review of the classification at 0.5 cut
value would seem to be a fairly good model (Table
4). However, as the objective of our study is to
identify the model that optimizes the combination of
overall accuracy and accuracy as to detecting
deceivers (i.e., “1s”), we ran two additional models,
using different cut-values.
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Table 4. Classification at 0.5 cutoff

due to the high accuracy as to classifying deceivers at
82.5%.

6. Limitations and Future Work

The second iteration of the logistic regression
analysis (depicted in Table 5) on this model was run
with a cut value of 0.4. The model illustrated in
Table 5 yielded an accuracy rate for classification of
“1s” of 85% with a slightly lower overall accuracy of
74% classifying truth-teller compared to the 75%
accuracy of Table 4.
Table 5. Classification at 0.4 cutoff

We further ran a third round of logistic regression
analysis at a cut value at 0.6 (depicted in Table 6).
This model yielded an accuracy rate in classifying
“1s” of only 65%, although the model classifies truthteller yielded 85% accuracy, and the overall model
had an accuracy of 75% (which was not different
from the results where the cut-off value was set to
0.5).
Table 6. Classification at 0.6 cutoff

One of the limitations involves with the adoption
of the Google+ Hangout as the players’
communication platform. For example, players
frequently experienced technical problems in logging
into the Google+ pseudo accounts created for the
game, and launching the game interface we
developed. It is our observation that these difficulties
not only confused and distracted participants/ players,
but also detracted from the overall amount of time
they spent in the game itself, thus reducing our ability
to collect more conversational data. To address this
problem, our future work includes reconstructing the
game on an independent/ stand-alone platform. We
also plan to design and develop an automated
participant assignment (i.e., pairing) system within
the new platform, so that players are no longer
manually paired.
We believe that research participation should be
carried out with benefits of both learning and fun
experience to participants. We thus plan to increase
the strength of competitive aspect of the game by
systematically reporting participants’ guesses (i.e.,
correct or incorrect answers) during the game. By
providing more feedback to the participants, it may
help them make better decisions. At the same time,
we can also observe how research participants make
both deception decisions as well as detector’s
decisions in capturing the liar.
The final noteworthy limitation with respect to
this study involves the sample size of the dataset,
which we acknowledge is fairly small. We anticipate
that in our future work, we will run the study to a
broader audience of potential participants in order to
get a larger dataset. Nonetheless, we submit that the
results of the current study are still suggestive and
encouraging.

7. Implications and Conclusions

To reiterate, the objective of our study is aimed at
computationally identifying deceptive agents based
on collective language-action cues in text-based
communication. Comparing results derived from the
three different cut values, we suggest the model with
cut value at 0.4 as illustrated in Table 5 is the
optimal combination of overall accuracy at 73.8%

Computer-mediated deception can be modeled
based on the core components of stigmergic signals
including the agents, the environment, and the signs
of communicative intent. This study demonstrates the
efficacy of modeling stigmergic signals to
differentiate deceivers (agents) from truth-tellers
(agents) based on collective language-action cues
(signs) in synchronous pairwise interaction
(environment). Our results demonstrate that, in the
context of text-based synchronous CMC, it is the
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overall combination of language-action cues (signs),
rather than specific words used by deceivers to
deceive, as most indicative of deception. Research
exploring machine learning approach appears
promising in detecting computer-mediated deception
[23]. Moreover, the merit of our game design
specifically emphasizes not just synchronous
communication—but spontaneity within synchronous
communication [22]. That is, our results provide
computational
intelligence
in
differentiating
computer-mediated deception in synchronous
spontaneous CMC, and the results inform the design
of a crowd-sourced online polygraph system in the
CMC context where F2F interaction is not available.
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